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Stochastic Potential Games
David Mguni∗†
Abstract
Computing the Nash equilibrium (NE) for N−player non-zerosum stochastic games is a
formidable challenge. Currently, algorithmic methods in stochastic game theory are unable to
compute NE for stochastic games (SGs) for settings in all but extreme cases in which the play-
ers either play as a team or have diametrically opposed objectives in a two-player setting. This
greatly impedes the application of the SG framework to numerous problems within economics and
practical systems of interest. In this paper, we provide a method of computing Nash equilibria
in nonzero-sum settings and for populations of players more than two. In particular, we iden-
tify a subset of SGs known as stochastic potential games (SPGs) for which the (Markov perfect)
Nash equilibrium can be computed tractably and in polynomial time. Unlike SGs for which, in
general, computing the NE is PSPACE -hard, we show that SGs with the potential property are
P-Complete. We further demonstrate that for each SPG there is a dual Markov decision process
whose solution coincides with the MP-NE of the SPG. We lastly provide algorithms that tractably
compute the MP-NE for SGs with more than two players.
1 Introduction
Game theory (GT) is a mathematical framework that is used for making predictions about outcomes
in systems with self-interested and interacting players. In these settings, each player reasons about the
environment and the actions of other players to decide on actions that maximise their own rewards.
In the simplest setting, the situation is a one-off interaction in which the players’ rewards for each
joint action are described by a matrix or a normal form game [OR94]. Stochastic games (SGs) [Sha53]
generalise normal form games to a dynamic setting in which actions determine both an immediate
reward and influence probabilistic transitions of a system across a sequence of states. The system
state, in turn, determines the reward structure of the current interaction.
SGs have found widespread applications, economics problems [Mgu18; CG10], robotics [MG07],
evolutionary biology [TH09] and computer networks [NAB09], smart grids [PA17] are a just few such
examples. However, despite the success of GT in providing a formal tool for modelling various practical
settings, a key challenge is computing the solution concept to games, i.e., the Nash equilibrium (NE)
and its variants in non-zerosum games [GS09]. Indeed, computing the Nash equilibrium for SGs
has remained an open challenge. The absence of tractable techniques has prevented application of
stochastic game theory to many real-world scenarios.
In stochastic settings with Markovian transitions, the appropriate solution concept is a Markov
perfect Nash equilibrium (MP-NE) whose computation remains a formidable challenge in all but a
handful of simple classes of games. Existing solutions of such MP-NE refer to extreme circumstances
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namely two-player zero-sum games and so-called team games in which all players share the same
reward function. In particular, tractable algorithms have been advanced for zero-sum SGs and team
SGs [WS03]. In practice these settings are usually far away from reality of systems of interest. Indeed
apart from a few restrictive cases in which neither the joint action (of all players) nor the current state
influences the state transitions (so-called separable reward state independent games), to date there
exists no reliable algorithm for computing NE for non-zerosum SGs [RF91]. As such, the challenge
of tractably computing MP-NE for N -player non-zerosum SGs remains an unaddressed yet crucial
problem. The obstacle in computing the NE in SGs is partly as a consequence of the fact that without
a known structure to represent the problem tractably, the problem lies in a complexity class known as
PPAD (Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs) which prohibits brute force and exhaustive
search solution methods.
In this paper, we tackle the problem of computing the MP-NE of nonzero-sum SGs in a tractable
fashion. For the systems we solve, the players’ interaction need not be perfectly adversarial nor are they
requried to act as a team (however there are cases of games in these classes also covered by our setting).
In this sense, the problem solved by our invention covers solving MP-NE in for systems that better
fit with most physical systems. Therefore to our knowledge, this paper provides the first method that
enables the MP-NE (best-response) strategies in systems with populations of self-interested players to
be computed tractably.
To perform this task, we study a subclass of nonzero-sum games that admit a particular structure
on each stage game, namely games that satisfy a potential game property. Potential games (PGs)
are a class of games that have been widely studied within GT in large part due to the fact they
model various real-world scenarios [LCS16]. PGs are endowed with special properties that provide
convergence guarantees to (pure strategy) NE. In particular, a number of algorithms such as best-
response, fictitious play and best reply are all known to converge in PGs [You04].
Generalising PGs to SGs offers the prospect of conferring to SGs the convergence properties and
the numerous computational benefits observed in static PGs. However, the PG framework has thus
far resisted attempts to generalise to stochastic settings. Attempts to extend the potentiality property
to SGs have thus far required a number of strong restrictive assumptions that impair the generality of
the game.
We propose a dynamic formulation of PGs which generalises PGs to a stochastic setting with
Markovian transitions. By introducing a novel construction of the stochastic generalisation, we show
that exact solutions of the MP-NE of non-zerosum SGs in this class can be computed tractably. To
achieve this, we show that for this class of games, there exists a dual Markov decision process (MDP)
the solutions of which coincide with the MP-NE of the SPG. As we demonstrate, this property induces
a vast reduction in computational complexity for the task of computing the MP-NE.
Our analysis also reveals a continuity property of the MP-NE in SPGs for changes in the reward
function. This result is particularly beneficial when large numbers of games must be analysed, a need
which commonly arises in in mechanism design and principal-agent problems [Cai+18].
The contributions of the paper are as follows: i) We extend the notion of PGs to a stochastic
setting from an extrapolation of the PG property at the stage game to cover the multi-stage SG. ii)
We show that this allows for the problem of solving the game to be transformed into a team game
which has an MDP representation. We then give some results on the resulting reduction in complexity
for the problem of computing MP-NE, therefore demonstrating that solving MP-NE in SPGs is of a
lower complexity than for general SGs. iii) We then give two algorithms which provably converge to
MP-NE for SPGs. The first algorithm is a centralised algorithm which computes the MP-NE using
a centralised dynamic programming method. The second algorithm is a distributed method which
enables tractable computation of the MP-NE even when the player population grows to be large. iv)
Lastly, we show that MP-NE of SPGs exhibit a continuity property under changes to the game reward
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functions. This property ensures that games that have similar properties all have MP-NE that all lie
within some neighbourhood of each other.
2 Related work
PGs have been widely studied within GT. The first systematic treatment of PGs appeared in [MS96] in
which it was shown that PGs are guaranteed to have a pure NE — a property which is not guaranteed
in general by the Nash theorem. Since then a large body of literature has been dedicated to analysing
the computational properties of various algorithms which seek to find the NE [LCS16]. Additionally,
the study of PGs has been extended to settings with unknown rewards and in which the players’
observe noisy feedback [LM11; HCM17], infinite populations [San01; CH17] and multi-agent (mean
field) reinforcement learning [MJC18].
However, the analysis of dynamic PGs is at present extremely sparse. Among the few, a dynamic
PG with a deterministic transition function is studied in [Zaz+15]. It considers open-loop policies in
which the players’ decisions takes no account of the state but is a function of time. Generalising to
stochastic settings is complicated by the fact that players must now execute policies that depend on
the state and may need to directly take into account the actions of other players.
In this direction, [GH13] consider a SG with a potentiality property in which they derive sufficiency
conditions for an NE in a Markov game. However the treatment requires two limiting assumptions:
firstly each player’s reward function must be a concave function of the state. Secondly, the transition
function is required to be invertible in order to express the policy in reduced form. Additionally, the
solution method relies on verifying that a parameterised policy satisfies a set of sufficiency conditions
which imposes further difficulties given the size of the space of functions. Macua et al. 2018 initiated
the study of potential games within a stochastic setting thus paving the way for exporting the benefits
for potential games to Markov games. In [MZZ18] however the potentiality condition is imposed
directly on the value functions. This formulation requires that the players’ policies depend only on
disjoint state-components meaning that players can only strategically respond to the actions of a local
subset of players. This restriction prohibits non-local interactions between players.
In our analysis, we show by introducing the potentiality condition at the stage game, we can
extrapolate the potentiality property to cover SGs. We then subsequently derive the generalised
versions of the PG properties for the SG which reveals that the equilibrium of the game in pure
strategies can be found by merely solving an MDP. However na¨ıve attempts to solve such an MDP
would lead to a combinatorial explosion in the number of players since the computation of optimal
strategy in the MDP setting appears in a centralised form in which optimisations are performed over
the joint action space. After demonstrating a method by which the potential can be computed, we
provide an algorithm based on dynamic programming method in which the computation is distributed
among the players which in turn avoids any combinatorial explosion.
This paper generalises the results of the static state-based PG in [Mar12] and the results in the
deterministic dynamic PG in [Zaz+15] (with open loop controls) to now cover stochastic settings with
state dependent (closed loop) controls. Additionally, unlike [MZZ18], our framework avoids the need
to impose the disjointness assumption, in which the players’ strategies must depend only on disjoint
subsets of components of the state.
Notation
We denote the set of players by N := {1, . . . , N} where N ∈ N. Given a metric space X, we denote
by dX : X × X → R≥0 the metric associated to X and by Bα(x) , {y ∈ X : ‖x − y‖ < α}
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the open ball with radius α > 0 around x ∈ X. We denote by (xi)i∈N ≡ (x1, . . . , xN ) and by
f−i = (f1, . . . , fi−1, fi+1, . . . , fN) for a given set of functions {fi}1≤i≤N . .
3 Potential games
PGs are a class of games that have been widely studied within GT in large part due to the fact they
model various real-world scenarios [LCS16]. Examples include cooperative control for consensus based
problems e.g. dynamic sensor coverage, distributed control, smart grid [Bau16; Saa+12; MAS09],
traffic network problems and spectrum sharing [Zaz+15] (more generally, congestion games), labelling
within computer vision [YB95], cooperative control (team games) [FFC18], network resource allocation
problems [SBP06].
A game is defined by a tuple M = 〈N , (Ai)i∈N , (Ri)i∈N 〉 where N := {1, . . . , N} is the set of
players, Ai is an action set for each player i ∈ N and Ri : ×i∈NAi → R is the reward function for
player i. Each player i employs a strategy πi ∈ Πi which it uses to decide its action ai ∈ Ai where Πi
is the player i strategy space. We denote by A = ×i∈NAi and Π := ×i∈NΠi (the joint strategy set).
Definition 1 A game M is an (exact) PG if there exists a measurable function φ : S ×A→ R such
that the following holds for any (ai, a−i), (a
′
i, a−i) ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , ∀st ∈ S:
Ri(st, (a
i
t, a
−i
t ))− Ri(st, (a
′i
t , a
−i
t )) = φ(st, (a
i
t, a
−i
t ))− φ(st, (a
′i
t , a
−i
t )), (1)
where a−it := (a
1
t , . . . a
i−1
t , a
i+1
t , . . . , a
N
t ).
Condition (1) says that the difference in payoff induced by a single deviation by one of the players is
exactly quantified by a difference in φ, a function over state and joint actions.
The condition is satisfied in a vast range of games. Common examples include congestion games,
network games, team games, identical interest games (in which players have identical reward functions)
and classic games such as the prisoner’s dilemma [LCS16].
Since the functions (Ri)i∈N are differentiable in the action inputs, we first we note that the following
∀ai, a′i ∈ Ai, a−i ∈ A−i, ∀s ∈ S:
Ri(s, a
i, a−i)− Ri(s, a
′i, a−i) =
∫ a′i
ai
∂Ri(s, a, a
−i)
∂a
da (2)
and
φ(s, ai, a−i)− φ(s, a′i, a−i) =
∫ a′i
ai
∂φ(s, a, a−i)
∂a
da (3)
Hence we quickly deduce that ∀ai, a′i ∈ Ai, a−i ∈ A−i, ∀s ∈ S:
∂Ri(s, a, a
−i)
∂a
=
∂φ(s, a, a−i)
∂a
(4)
It has long been understood that normal form PGs admit a team game representation [LCS16].
Consequently, the problem of finding a NE is reduced to finding some (global) maximum of a function,
namely the potential of the game.1 In the case of Fig. 2, the NE for the prisoner’s dilemma ((D,D))
and coordination game ((H,H)) can be inferred immediately from the PG. This benefit is even more
1For games with nonconvex potentials, other NE exist and correspond to local maxima of the potential.
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apparent in games with larger actions sets and more players, to exemplify, an N−player game with
binary action sets has 2N possible outcomes.
In general, computing the NE in normal form games requires methods such as vertex enumeration,
Lemke-Howson algorithm which is PSPACE -complete [GPS13; Von02; M+96]. This is computational
issue becomes further exacerbated in games beyond two players. In games for which a potential exists,
reducing the problem to finding some maximum entry of a potential (matrix) leads to a vast reduction
in complexity as illustrated in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.
H P
H 10, 10 0, 0
P 0, 0 5, 5
(a) Coordination Game
C D
C −1,−1 −6, 0
D 0,−6 −4,−4
(b) Prisoner’s Dilemma
Figure 1: Classic potential games
H P
H 10 0
P 0 5
(a) Coordination Game
C D
C 1 2
D 2 4
(b) Prisoner’s Dilemma
Figure 2: Potential game representations
The main contribution of this paper is to extend this computational advantage to a class of SGs
with a potential property.
4 Stochastic Potential Games
We now discuss SPGs which is the main subject of the paper. First we give a description of SGs.
S
A
B
T t = 1 t = 2 t = 3S
A B C
D E F
T
Figure 3: A simple network (left) can be naturally described in terms of normal form games, but may
be inadequate for modelling real world scenarios which involve changes of state over time. For larger
and more complex networks (right), in which players traverse nodes over time, a more appropriate
description is an SG. Although SGs are reducible to normal form games, the normal form representation
yields an exponential growth in complexity in the number of states and players, rendering this approach
intractable for games with even modestly sized player populations and state spaces. For example, in
the case of the congestion game described by a network graph, reducing the game to a normal form
description leads to exponential scaling in the size of the network.
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An SG is an augmented MDP which proceeds by two or more players tacking actions that jointly
manipulate the transitions of a system over T ∈ N rounds which may be infinite. At each round, the
players receive some immediate reward or cost which is a function of the players’ current joint actions
and the current state. In a SG, at a given time, the players simultaneously play one of many possible
stage games M which are indexed by states that lie within some state space S. The outcome of each
stage gameM(s) depends on the joint action executed by the players where ais ∈ Ai is the action taken
by player i ∈ N and s ∈ S is the state of the world and Ai is the action set for player i. Given some
stage gameM(s) for s ∈ S, the players simultaneously execute a joint action as = (a1s, a
2
s, . . . , a
N
s ) ∈ A
and immediately thereafter, each player i ∈ N receives a payoff Ri(s,as), the state then transitions
to s′ ∈ S with probability P (s′; s,as) where the game M(s′) is played.
Formally, we consider an SG defined by a tuple G = 〈N ,S, (Ai)i∈N , P, (Ri)i∈N , γ〉 where N :=
{1, . . . , N} is the set of players for some N ∈ N, S is a finite set of states, Ai is an action set for
each player i ∈ N and the function Ri : S × A → R is the one-step reward for player i. The map
P : S × A × S → [0, 1] is a Markov transition probability matrix i.e. P (s′|s,as) is the probability of
the state s′ being the next state given the system is in state s and the joint action as ∈ A is played.
Therefore the SG proceeds as follows: given some stage game M(s) = 〈(Ai)i∈N , (Ri)i∈N ,N〉, the
players simultaneously execute a joint action as := (a
1
s, . . . , a
N
s ) ∈ A and immediately thereafter, each
player i ∈ N receives a payoff Ri(s,as), the state then transitions to s′ ∈ S with probability P (s′|s,as)
where the game M(s′) is played in which the players receive a reward discounted by γ.
Now, each player employs a strategy, πi ∈ Πi to decide its action at s ∈ S. For an SG, G, the goal
of each player i ∈ N is to determine a policy πi ∈ Πi that maximises the following quantity:
v
πi,π−i
i (s) = Eπi,π−i,st∼P
[∑
t≥0
γtRi(st,at)|s0 = s
]
.
For each player i ∈ N , a pure strategy is a map πi : S → Ai that assigns to every state an action in
Ai. Similarly, for each player i ∈ N , a behavioural strategy is a map πi : S × Ai → [0, 1] that assigns
to every state s ∈ S a probability distribution in Ai.2 We denote the space of behavioural strategies
(pure strategies) for each player i ∈ N by Πi (Π
p
i ). Note that pure strategies are a degenerate class
of behavioural strategies which assign to any state s ∈ S the Dirac measure with its probability mass
concentrated at a single point.
Remark 1 Note that a team game settings (e.g. [AY16] ) correspond to the degenerate case of our
setting when R1 = R2 = . . . = RN . Similarly, it can be shown PGs also encompass some zero-sum
games (e.g. Ex. 4 in [Bal+18]).
In order to describe the stable outcomes in an SG, we adopt the following variant of the NE which
is appropriate for SGs with Markov transitions [FT91]:
Definition 2 A strategy profile pi⋆ = (π⋆i , π
⋆
−i) ∈ Π is a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (MP-NE)
in Markov strategies if the following condition holds for any i ∈ N :
v
(π⋆i ,π
⋆
−i)
i (s) ≥ v
(π′i,π
⋆
−i)
i (s), ∀s ∈ S, ∀π
′
i ∈ Πi. (5)
The condition characterises strategic configurations in which at any state no player can improve their
expected cumulative rewards by unilaterally deviating from their current strategy.
2By Kuhn’s theorem [Rit+02], if the player retains a history of previous actions and states, each behavioural strategy
has an equivalent mixed strategy.
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For infinite horizon SGs with Markov transitions we can safely dispense with path dependencies
in the strategies. Moreover, for MP-NE attention can be restricted to stationary stochastic policies
(behavioural strategies) that depend only on the current state, namely stationary Markov strategies
which contain strategies of the form πi : S ×Ai → [0, 1].3 We refer the interested reader to [Hil79] for
exhaustive discussions.
A pure strategy MP-NE (PS-MP-NE) is when condition (5) holds in pure strategies. Unlike
mixed strategies, PS-MP-NE give predictions of the game outcomes which do not involves randomness
introduced by the players. This endows the PS-MP-NE concept with strong predictive properties
[OR94]. However, the existence of an NE is in general only guaranteed when the players execute
mixed strategies. We denote by NE{G} the set of MP-NE strategies for the game G.
Determining whether a (pure-strategy) NE exists in an SG is PSPACE -hard [CS08], moreover, the
SG remains NP-hard even in the case in which the time horizon T is finite [CS08]. In this paper, we
show that for a class of SGs with a PG property, computing the MP-NE in pure strategies is reducible
to solving an MDP which significantly reduces the computational difficulty in computing the MP-NE
in pure strategies.
We now adapt the potentiality condition to accommodate a state-based setting with the following
definition:
Definition 3 A stage game M(s) is an (exact) state-based potential game (PG) if there exists a
function φ : S ×A → R (φ ∈ H) such that the following holds for any (ai, a−i), (a′i, a−i) ∈ A where
a−it := (a
1
t , . . . a
i−1
t , a
i+1
t , . . . , a
N
t ) ∀i ∈ N , ∀st ∈ S:
Ri(st, (a
i
t, a
−i
t ))− Ri(st, (a
′i
t , a
−i
t )) = φ(st, (a
i
t, a
−i
t ))− φ(st, (a
′i
t , a
−i
t )), . (6)
Condition (6) says that the difference in payoff induced by a single deviation by one of the players is
exactly quantified by a difference in a function φ, a function over state and joint actions.
Where convenient, we will use the shorthand φ(π
i,π−i)(s) ≡ Eπi,π−i [φ(s, a
i
s, a
−i
s )] and R
(πi,π−i)
i (s) ≡
Eπi,π−i [Ri(s, a
i
s, a
−i
s )] for any s ∈ S and for any πi ∈ Πi, π−i ∈ Π−i and for each i ∈ N .
Definition 4 An SPG, G is an SG which each stage game M is a PG. SPGs generalise PGs to the
dynamic setting with Markovian transitions.
Definition 5 A stage game M(s) is state transitive if there exists a function φ : S×A→ R (φ ∈ H)
such that the following holds for any (ai, a−i) ∈ A where ∀i ∈ N , ∀st, s′t ∈ S:
Ri(st, (a
i
t, a
−i
t ))−Ri(s
′
t, (a
i
t, a
−i
t )) = φ(st, (a
i
t, a
−i
t ))− φ(s
′
t, (a
i
t, a
−i
t )). (7)
The intuition is the following: consider a metric space (S, d), then the reduction in reward faced by
agent i ∈ N that seeks a goal state s⋆i ∈ S but arrives at state s
′
i ∈ S is equal to the reduction in
reward that agent j ∈ N faces when it seeks to arrive at goal state s⋆j ∈ S but arrives at state s
′
jS
whenever d(s⋆i , s
′
i) = d(s
⋆
j , s
′
j) for a given metric d.
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Having introduced an SPG, we now proceed to analysing the construction and demonstrating its
properties.
In the next section, we perform the main analysis. There we prove that solving SPGs reduces to
solving an MDP and inherits the P-complete complexity class.
3There are some exceptions for games with payoff structures not considered here for example, limiting average
(Ergodic) payoffs [BF68].
4This condition is a milder condition than the construction of the PG in [Mar12] for which the PF is assumed to be
non-decreasing along any action invariant state trajectory.
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5 Main Analysis
We now turn to proving the main results. The first result reduces the task of finding the MP-NE of
the game (which generally involves finding a fixed point) to solving an MDP. This vastly reduces the
complexity of the problem and unlocks dynamic programming methods for computing the solution.
Following this, we study the associated MDP and show that the MP-NE exhibits a continuity property
w.r.t changes in the reward functions of the game.
Assumptions
The results contained within the paper are built under the following assumptions:
Assumption A.1. The functions {Ri}i∈N are bounded, measurable, differentiable functions in the
action and state inputs.
Assumption A.2. The strategy spaces (Πi)i∈N are compact.
Assumption A.3. The state transitivity assumption holds.
The results of Sec. 7 are built under this assumption:
Assumption A.4. The functions (Ri,θ)i∈N satisfy assumption A.1 and are Lipschitz in the parameter
θ, that is there exists constants (cRi)i∈N > 0 s.th. for any θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ and for any i ∈ N , we have that
|Ri,θ −Ri,θ′ | ≤ cRid (θ, θ
′).
We now state the main results of the paper:
Theorem 1 There exists a PS-MP-NE whenever ∀s ∈ S
sup
π
′∈Π
Bπ
′
(s) 6= ∅ (8)
We prove the theorem through a set of results that first show the game has an equivalent represen-
tation in which all players maximise the same function and thus, play a team game. In particular, the
PS-MP-NE of G correspond to the extreme points of some functional.
Theorem 2 SPGs are reducible to single player MDPs. In particular, for any SPG G, there exists a
measurable function (which depends on G) B : Π × S → R whose maxima are attained when a policy
pi⋆ ∈ NE(G) is executed.
Theorem 2 reduces the problem of finding a fixed point in the space of strategies to finding optimal
joint policy of an MDP. The theorem therefore reveals that unlike general SGs, games of this type lie
in a lower complexity class.
Since solving the game is reducible to solving an MDP, we deduce the following which is a conse-
quence of Theorem 1 in [PT87]:
Corollary 1 Computing the PS-MP-NE for SPGs is P-Complete.
In Lemma 3, we give an exact characterisation of the function B by way of computing a line integral.
Moreover, Algorithm 3 provides a means to compute B without needing to compute a line integral.
Proposition 1 For any PG, there exists a function B : Π× S → R (B ∈ H) such that the following
holds for any i ∈ N :
Ri(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) = φ(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) + F−i(s, a
−i
t ), (9)
where Fi satisfies the following condition
F−i(s, a
−i
t ) = F−i(s
′, a−it ). (10)
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The result generalises dummy-coordination separability known in PGs to a state-based setting [Sla94;
Ui00].
Proof 1 To establish the forward implication, we make the following observation which is straightfor-
ward:
Ri(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t )−Ri(s, a
′i
t , a
−i
t ) (11)
= φ(s, ait, a
−i
t ) + F−i(s, a
−i
t )−
(
φ(s, ait, a
−i
t ) + F−i(s, a
−i
t )
)
(12)
= φ(s, ait, a
−i
t )− φ(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t ). (13)
To prove the reverse, and assume that the game is state-based potential. Let us now define the function
Ti(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) := Ri(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t )− φ(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t ), then we observe that:
Ri(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t )− Ri(s, a
′i
t , a
−i
t ) = φ(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t )− φ(s, a
′i
t , a
−i
t ) (14)
⇐⇒ (15)
Ri(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t )− φ(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) = Ri(s, a
′i
t , a
−i
t )− φ(s, a
′i
t , a
−i
t ), (16)
and hence
Ti(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) = Ti(s, a
′i
t , a
−i
t ), (17)
which implies that Ti(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) ≡ Ki(s, a
−i
t ). In a similar way, writing Ti(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) := Ri(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t )−
φ(s, ait, a
−i
t ) and using the state transitive property, we deduce that Ti(s
′, ait, a
−i
t ) = Ti(s, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) which
settles the proof.
Proposition 2 For any joint strategy (πi, π−i) ∈ Π, define by vi,k the value function for the finite
horizon game of length k ∈ N (i.e. v(πi,π−i)i,k (s) := Est∼P,πi,π−i
[∑k
t=0 γ
tRi(st,at)|s ≡ s0
]
for any i ∈ N
and k < ∞). Then there exists a measurable function Bk : Π × S → R such that the following holds
for any i ∈ N and ∀πi, π′i ∈ Πi, ∀π−i ∈ Π−i and ∀s ∈ S:
Es∼P (·|)
[
v
(πi,π−i)
i,k (s)− v
(π′i,π−i)
i,k (s)
]
= Es∼P (·|)
[
B
(πi,π−i)
k (s)− B
(π′i,π−i)
k (s)
]
. (18)
Prop. 2 extends the potentiality property to finite horizon SGs. In doing so it shows that the useful
properties of PGs are preserved within an MG setting. Unlike [GH13; MZZ18], Prop. 2 requires no
further assumptions beyond the potentiality of each stage game.
The proof of the proposition is quite lengthy and is therefore deferred to the appendix.
Thus far we have established the relation (18) holds only for the finite horizon case. We now extend
the coverage to the infinite horizon case in which we can recover the use of stationary strategies. In
order to perform the extension, we first require some preliminary results (Lemma 1 and Lemma 2)
which study the limiting behaviour of terms involving B.
Lemma 1 For any t′ <∞, define by
B
(πi,π−i)
t′ (s) := Est∼P,πi,π−i
[∑t′
t=0 γ
tφ(st,at)|s ≡ s0
]
then ∃B(πi,π−i) such that ∀s ∈ S and for any
(πi, π−i) ∈ Π,
lim
t→∞
B
(πi,π−i)
t (s) = B
(πi,π−i)(s), s ≡ s0, (19)
where for any πi ∈ Πi, π−i ∈ Π−i, the function B(πi,π−i) is given by:
B(πi,π−i)(s) := EP,π
[
∞∑
t=0
γtφ(st,at)|s ≡ s0
]
. (20)
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The result is proven by showing that the sequence B
(πi,π−i)
n , B
(πi,π−i)
n+1 , . . . converges uniformly, that is
the sequence is a Cauchy sequence.
Proof 2 We prove the result by showing that the sequence B
(πi,π−i)
n , B
(πi,π−i)
n+1 , . . . converges uniformly,
that is the sequence is a Cauchy sequence. In particular, we show that ∀ǫ > 0, ∃T ′ > 0 s.th. ∀t′, t′′ > T ′
and for any πi ∈ Πi, π−i ∈ Π−i ∥∥∥B(πi,π−i)t′ − B(πi,π−i)t′′ ∥∥∥ < ǫ. (21)
Firstly, we deduce that the function φ is bounded since each Ri is bounded also (see (45) in the appendix).
Now w.log., consider the case when t′ ≥ t′′. We begin by observing the fact that
B
(πi,π−i)
t′ (s)− B
(πi,π−i)
t′′ (s) (22)
= Est∼P (·;st−1,at−1),πi,π−i
[
t′∑
t=0
γtφt(st,at)−
t′′∑
t=0
γtφt(st,at)
]
(23)
= Est∼P (·;st−1,at−1),πi,π−i
[
t′∑
t=t′′
γtφt(st,at)
]
. (24)
Hence, we find that
∣∣∣B(πi,π−i)t′ (s)−B(πi,π−i)t′′ (s)∣∣∣ (25)
=
∣∣∣∣∣Est∼P (·;st−1,at−1),πi,π−i
[
t′∑
t=t′′
γtφt(st,at)
]∣∣∣∣∣ (26)
≤
t′∑
t=t′′
γt‖φ‖∞ ≤ |γ|
∣∣γt′′ − γt′∣∣
1− γ
‖φ‖∞ (27)
≤ |γt
′′
|
∣∣1− γt′−t′′∣∣
1− γ
‖φ‖∞ (28)
≤
|γt
′′
|
1− γ
‖φ‖∞ = e
t′′ lnγ ‖φ‖∞
1− γ
(29)
= e−t
′′| lnγ|
(
‖φ‖∞
1− γ
)
≤ e−T
′| ln γ|
(
‖φ‖∞
1− γ
)
, (30)
using Cauchy-Schwarz and since t′ ≥ t′′ > T ′ and γ ∈ [0, 1[.
The inequality of the proposition is true whenever T ′ is chosen to satisfy
T ′ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣ln (ǫ)(ln (γ)
(
‖φ‖∞
1− γ
)−1∣∣∣∣∣ , (31)
hence the result is proven.
Lemma 2
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣Es∼P (·|) [B(πi,π−i)i,t (s)−B(π′i,π−i)i,t (s)]∣∣∣ <∞.
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Proof 3 Our first task is to establish that the quantity∣∣∣ lim
t→∞
Es∼P (·|)
[
B
(πi,π−i)
i,t (s)−B
(π′i,π−i)
i,t (s)
]∣∣∣ is in fact, well-defined for any s ∈ S and ∀i ∈ N .
This is true since by (83) for any t > 0 we have that∣∣∣Es∼P (·|) [B(πi,π−i)i,t (s)−B(π′i,π−i)i,t (s)]∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Es∼P (·|) [v(πi,π−i)i,t (s)− v(π′i,π−i)i,t (s)]∣∣∣ , (32)
and hence we have that ∣∣∣Es∼P (·|) [B(πi,π−i)(s)− B(π′i,π−i)(s)]∣∣∣ <∞.
To see this, we firstly observe that by the boundedness of Ri, ∃c > 0 s.th. ∀t ∈ N, ∀i ∈ N and for
any πi ∈ Πi, π−i ∈ Π−i ∣∣∣v(πi,π−i)i,t (s)− v(π′i,π−i)i,t (s)∣∣∣ < c. (33)
This is true since for any k <∞ we have
v
(πi,π−i)
i,k (s)− v
(π′i,π−i)
i,k (s) (34)
= Est∼P,πi,π−i
[
k∑
t=0
γtRi(st,at)
]
− Est∼P,π′i,π−i
[
k∑
t=0
γtRi(st,at)
]
(35)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣Est∼P,πi,π−i
[
k∑
t=0
γtRi(st,at)
]
− Est∼P,π′i,π−i
[
k∑
t=0
γtRi(st,at)
] ∣∣∣∣∣ (36)
≤ Est∼P,πi,π−i
[
k∑
t=0
γt |Ri(st,at)|
]
+ Est∼P,π′i,π−i
[
k∑
t=0
γt |Ri(st,at)|
]
(37)
≤ 2
k∑
t=0
γt‖Ri‖∞ = 2
1− γk
1− γ
‖Ri‖∞. (38)
Therefore, by the bounded convergence theorem we have that
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣Es∼P (·|) [v(πi,π−i)i,t (s)− v(π′i,π−i)i,t (s)]∣∣∣ <∞. (39)
Now, using (32), we deduce that for any ǫ > 0, the following statement holds:∣∣∣Es∼P (·|) [B(πi,π−i)i,t (s)− B(π′i,π−i)i,t (s)]∣∣∣
<
∣∣∣Es∼P (·|) [v(πi,π−i)i,t (s)− v(π′i,π−i)i,t (s)]∣∣∣+ ǫ, (40)
which after taking the limit as t → ∞ and using (39), Lemma 1 and the dominated convergence
theorem, we find that
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣Es∼P (·|) [B(πi,π−i)i,t (s)−B(π′i,π−i)i,t (s)]∣∣∣ <∞.
We now extend the finite horizon dynamic potential property (18) to the infinite horizon case:
Proposition 3 There exists a measurable function B : Π× S → R such that the following holds for
any i ∈ N and ∀πi, π′i ∈ Πi, ∀π−i ∈ Π−i and ∀s ∈ S:
Es∼P (·|)
[
v
(πi,π−i)
i (s)− v
(π′i,π−i)
i (s)
]
= Es∼P (·|)
[
B(πi,π−i)(s)− B(π
′
i,π−i)(s)
]
.
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Proof 4 The result is proven by contradiction.
To this end, let us firstly assume ∃c 6= 0 such that
Es∼P (·|)
[
v
(πi,π−i)
i (s)− v
(π′i,π−i)
i (s)
]
− Es∼P (·|)
[
B
(πi,π−i)
i (s)− B
(π′i,π−i)
i (s)
]
= c.
Let us now define the following quantities for any s ∈ S and for each πi ∈ Πi and π−i ∈ Π−i and
∀i ∈ N :
v
(πi,π−i)
i,T ′ (s) :=
T ′∑
t=0
µ(s0)πi(a
i
0, s0)π−i(a
−i
0 , s0)
t−1∏
j=0
∑
sj+1∈S
γtP (sj+1|sj, a
i
j , a
−i
j )
·πi(a
i
j |sj)π−i(a
−i
j |sj)Ri(st, a
i
t, a
−i
t ),
and
B
(πi,π−i)
T ′ (s) :=
T ′∑
t=0
µ(s0)πi(a
i
0, s0)π−i(a
−i
0 , s0)
t−1∏
j=0
∑
sj+1∈S
P (sj+1|sj, a
i
j, a
−i
j )
·πi(a
i
j |sj)π−i(a
−i
j |sj)φ(st, a
i
t, a
−i
t ),
so that the quantity v
(πi,π−i)
i,T ′ (s) measures the expected cumulative return until the point T
′ <∞.
Hence, we straightforwardly deduce that
v
(πi,π−i)
i (s) ≡ v
(πi,π−i)
i,∞ (s)
= v
(πi,π−i)
i,T ′ (s) + γ
T ′µ(s0)πi(a
i
0, s0)π−i(a
−i
0 , s0)
T ′−1∏
j=0
∑
sj+1∈S
γtP (sj+1|sj, a
i
j, a
−i
j )
πi(a
i
j|sj)π−i(a
−i
j |sj) · v
(πi,π−i)
i (sT ′).
Next we observe that:
c = Es∼P (·|)
[(
v
(πi,π−i)
i − v
(π′i,π−i)
i
)
(s)
]
− Es∼P (·|)
[(
B(πi,π−i) −B(π
′
i,π−i)
)
(s)
]
= Es∼P (·|)
[(
v
(πi,π−i)
i,T ′ − v
(π′i,π−i)
i,T ′
)
(s)
]
− Es∼P (·|)
[(
B
(πi,π−i)
T ′ −B
(π′i,π−i)
T ′
)
(s)
]
+γT
′
EsT ′∼P (·|)
[
µ(s0)πi(a
i
0, s0)π−i(a
−i
0 , s0)
T ′−1∏
j=0
∑
sj+1∈S
P (sj+1|sj, a
i
j, a
−i
j )
πi(a
i
j |sj)π−i(a
−i
j |sj)
(
v
(πi,π−i)
i (sT ′)− B
(πi,π−i)(sT ′)
)
− µ(s0)π
′
i(a
′i
0 , s0)π−i(a
−i
0 , s0)
T ′−1∏
j=0
∑
sj+1∈S
P (sj+1|sj, a
′i
j , a
−i
j )
π′i(a
′i
j |sj)π−i(a
−i
j |sj)
(
v
(π′i,π−i)
i (sT ′)−B
(π′i,π−i)(sT ′)
)]
.
Considering the last expectation and its coefficient and denoting the product by κ, using the fact
that by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have ‖AX−BY ‖ ≤ ‖A‖‖X‖+‖B‖‖Y ‖, moreover whenever
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A,B are non-expansive5 we have that ‖AX − BY ‖ ≤ ‖X‖ + ‖Y ‖, hence we observe the following
bound:
κ ≤ ‖κ‖ ≤ 2γT
′
(‖vi‖+ ‖B‖) . (41)
Since we can choose T ′ freely and γ ∈]0, 1[, we can choose T ′ to be sufficiently large so that
γT
′
(‖vi‖+ ‖B‖) <
1
4
|c|. (42)
This then implies that∣∣∣∣∣Es∼P (·|)
[(
v
(πi,π−i)
i,T ′ − v
(π′i,π−i)
i,T ′
)
(s)−
(
B
(πi,π−i)
T ′ −B
(π′i,π−i)
T ′
)
(s)
]∣∣∣∣∣ > 12c,
which is a contradiction since thanks to Prop. 2, we have proven that for any finite T ′ it is the case
that
Es∼P (·|)
[(
v
(πi,π−i)
i,T ′ − v
(π′i,π−i)
i,T ′
)
(s)−
(
B
(πi,π−i)
T ′ −B
(π′i,π−i)
T ′
)
(s)
]
= 0,
and hence we deduce the thesis.
Prop. 3 indicates that the potentiality property is generalisable to SGs. In particular, there is a
functional which mimics the behaviour of the potential function in SGs.
In a similar way to (4), we can obtain the following differential equation for B for any pi ∈ Π, ∀i ∈
N , ∀s ∈ S:
∂vπi
∂πi
(s) =
∂Bπ
∂πi
(s). (43)
Our next result shows that the set of joint policies that maximise B are in fact NE policies of the
game.6 We will use this result to show that computing the NE for SPGs is a has a significantly reduced
computational complexity in comparison to SGs without this property.
Proposition 4 There exists a measurable function B : S ×Π → R such that for any s ∈ S we have
that
pi ∈ arg sup
π
′∈Π
Bπ
′
(s) =⇒ pi ∈ NE{G}. (44)
Proof 5 We do the proof by contradiction. Let pi = (π1, . . . , πN) ∈ arg sup
π′∈Π
Bπ
′
(s). Let us now there-
fore assume that pi /∈ NE{G}, hence there exists some other strategy profile pi′ = (π1, . . . , π′i, . . . , πN)
which contains at least one profitable deviation by one of the players so that π′i 6= πi for i ∈ N i.e.
v
(π′i,π−i)
i (s) > v
(πi,π−i)
i (s) (using the preservation of signs of integration). Prop. 3 however implies that
B(π
′
i,π−i)(s)− B(πi,π−i)(s) > 0 which is a contradiction since pi = (πi, π−i) is a maximum of B.
Having reduced the problem of finding a fixed point MP-NE to maximising B, we now characterise B.
We later show that B can be obtained using an iterative algorithm.
5An operator T : V → V is non-expansive if ∀V1, V2 ∈ V we have: ‖TV1 − TV2‖ ≤ ‖V1 − V2‖.
6More accurately, the MP-NE of the game correspond to local maxima of B.
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Lemma 3 The function B is given by the following expression for s ∈ S, ∀pi ∈ Π:
Bπ(s)− Bπ
′
(s) = Est∼P
[
∞∑
t=0
∑
i∈N
γt
∫ 1
0
γ ′(z)
∂Ri
∂πi
(st,γ(z))
∣∣∣s = s0
]
,
where γ(z) is a continuous differentiable path in Π connecting two strategy profiles pi ∈ Π and pi′ ∈ Π.
Proof 6 To ascertain the result, we note that from equation (2), using the gradient theorem of vector
calculus, it is straightforward to deduce that the potential function φ can be computed from the reward
functions (Ri)i∈N via the following expression [MS96]:
φπ(s) = φπ
′
(s) +
∑
i∈N
∫ 1
0
γ ′(z)
∂Ri
∂πi
(st,γ(z)), (45)
where γ(z) is a continuous differentiable path in Π connecting two strategy profiles pi ∈ Π and pi′ ∈ Π.
We then deduce the result for the finite case after inserting (45) into (20).
For the team Markov game case, the function B is straightforward to construct. In particu-
lar, let J be the global performance function for the team game G, then we have that Bπ(s) :=
Est∼P,π [
∑∞
t=0 γ
tJ(st,at)|s ≡ s0].
Proof 7 (Proof of Theorem 2) Combining Prop. 4 with Prop. 3 proves Theorem 2.
The characterisation of B provided by Lemma 3 yields a function B which is not unique. What remains
is to investigate any relation between such functions. The following result indicates that the space of
functions B contains functions that differ only by a constant:
Lemma 4 Let B1 and B2 be dynamic potentials that satisfy relation (3). Then the following relation
is satisfied:
B
πi,π−i
1 (s)−B
πi,π−i
2 (s) = c(λ), ∀(πi, π−i) ∈ Π, ∀s ∈ S.
where λ is the discount factor of G.
The result is proven after a straightforward extension of the static case (Lemma 2.7. in [MS96]).
6 Computing the equilibria
We now propose a set of algorithms to compute the MP-NE for the game iteratively. The first algorithm
is a centralised method which performs joint updates of the players’ actions with a known potential
function. The second algorithm computes the MP-NE in a decentralised fashion so that each player
performs independent updates. Unlike the first algorithm, this algorithm does not require the potential
function φ to be known in advance.
Having reduced the game to a standard MDP, we now introduce the following Bellman operator
from which, by the above analysis, it follows can be used to compute the solution to the game.
We now introduce the following recursive dynamic programming relationship:
Bk(s) = max
a∈A
[
φ(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s,a)Bk−1(s
′)
]
(46)
The following result is a direct consequence of Prop. 4 and the fact that thanks to Lemma 1 for any
s ∈ S, B(s) may be expressed as lim
t→∞
B
(πi,π−i)
t (s) = B
(πi,π−i)(s).
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Algorithm 1
1: For a given SG G, require B, φ, initial strategy profile pi, constant ǫ
2: Initialise B0(s) arbitrarily ∀s ∈ S.
3: repeat
4: k ← 0
5: for s ∈ S, i = 0, 1, . . . , N do
6: Build auxiliary game φ(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S P (s
′|s,a)B0(s′)
7: return B1(s) = max
a∈A
[
φ(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S P (s
′|s,a)B0(s′)
]
8: Bk(s)← max
a∈A
[
φ(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S P (s
′|s,a)Bk−1(s′)
]
9: k ← k + 1
10: end for
11: until |Bk(s)− Bk−1(s)| < ǫ, ∀s ∈ S.
Lemma 5 Consider the sequence T kBπ
′
(·), T k+1Bπ
′
(·), . . . and let
pi∞ ≡ (π1, . . . , πN) ∈ Π be the joint policy extracted from the limit of the sequence then pi⋆ ∈ NE{G}.
Algorithm 1 follows as a direct consequence of Lemma 5 which indicates that finding the maximum
of B can be obtained by dynamic programming.
Algorithm 1 is a dynamic programming method in which the game is treated as an MDP with
value function B. However, such a method computes the PS-MP-NE in a way that involves centralised
calculations within the joint action space. It additionally requires that the potential function φ be
known in advance or that B be computed using a line integral which may not be feasible in all cases.
We now provide a method of decentralising the computation in order to calculate the solution to
each stage game. Additionally, the following algorithm avoids the need to compute a line integral. The
following method relies on computing the NE for each stage game then computing the function B.
Integral to the algorithm is a generalised weakened fictitious play (GWFP) step. GWFP updates
the weights each player places on an action in the direction of the best response to their GWFP has
strong convergence guarantees for PGs [LC06].
Definition 6 A path is a sequence of elements p¯i = (pi(k))∞1 of elements in Π.
Note the the function obeys the following Bellman equation:
Bk(s) = max
a∈A
[
φ(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s,a)Bk−1(s
′)
]
, k = 1, 2, . . . , (47)
Algorithm 2 can be broken up into three components. The first computes the potential function φ
(for each s ∈ S) given the set of player rewards (Ri)i∈N . Second, the algorithm computes the MP-NE
for each auxiliary game defined by B
(·)
k using GWFP for 0 < k <∞. Note that each auxiliary game is
constructed using step 8 (so that the entries of this game contain the future stream of payoffs under
the current strategy). Lastly, the algorithm computes Bπ
⋆
using a value iterative approach. The
first component generalises current methods (e.g. the traverse procedure in [LCS16]) to extract the
potential to the case in which the reward functions are state dependent.
Steps 9 - 10 involve a generalised weakened fictitious play (GWFP) step. GWFP updates the
weights each player places on an action in the direction of the best response to their opponents’
actions. GWFP has strong convergence guarantees for PGs [LC06].
Theorem 3 Algorithm 2 converges to pi⋆.
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Algorithm 2
1: For a given SG G, require B, initial strategy profile pi, constant ǫ
2: compute potential function φ
3: For each s ∈ S find φ using Algorithm 3.
4: Initialise B0(s) arbitrarily ∀s ∈ S.
5: repeat
6: k ← 0
7: for s ∈ S, i = 0, 1, . . . , N do
8: Build auxiliary game φ(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S P (s
′|s,a)B0(s′)
9: Compute optimal joint action using actor-critic generalised weakened fictitious play
10: return B1(s) = max
a∈A
[
φ(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S P (s
′|s,a)B0(s′)
]
11: Bk(s)← max
a∈A
[
φ(s,a) + γ
∑
s′∈S P (s
′|s,a)Bk−1(s′)
]
12: k ← k + 1
13: end for
14: until |Bk(s)− Bk−1(s)| < ǫ, ∀s ∈ S
Proof 8 The proof of the algorithm follows from the following observations: i) by Prop. 2, for
each kth iteration Bk has a finite improvement path for which GWFP converges to max[φ(s,a) +
γ
∑
s′∈S P (s
′|s,a)Bi(s
′)] ii) by Lemma 5, ∀s ∈ S, the sequence T kBπ
′
(s), T k+1Bπ
′
(s), . . . converges to
the Bπ
⋆
(s) where pi⋆ ∈ NE{G}.
This completes the proof.
7 Regularity of Stochastic Potential Games
In general, MP-NE are highly sensitive to even small changes in the game [FT91]. In general, SGs
have the property that small changes in the structure of the game result can incur large changes to the
equilibrium of the game. Consequently, the equilibria of a SG are not informative about the outcomes
of other close SGs. The implications are that even intentional modification to multiplayer systems can
lead to highly undesirable outcomes [Tir+16].
The following sets of results establish that unlike SGs in general, SPGs enjoy smoothness properties
with respect to changes in its components.
First, we formalise the notion of continuity of the MP-NE with the following definition:
Definition 7 (Essentiality) Given a metric space X, let Bα(x) , {y ∈ X : ‖x − y‖ < α} denote
the open ball with radius α > 0 and denote by G(θ) the game G(θ) = 〈N ,S, (Ai)i∈N , P, (Ri,θ)i∈N , γ〉
where {Ri,θ}i∈N are parameterised reward functions and θ ∈ Θ. Then x ∈ NE{G(θ)} is essential
in θ ∈ Θ if for any ǫ > 0, ∃δ > 0 : θ′ ∈ Bǫ(θ) =⇒ x′ ∈ Bδ(x), for any x′ ∈ NE{G(θ′)}.
Definition 7 says that for any θ ∈ Θ a game G(θ) is essential if small changes in θ produce only a
small change in the NE of the game.
Theorem 4 Let {Gθ}θ∈Θ := 〈R, S,A, P, Rθ, γ〉θ∈Θ be a family of SPGs parameterised by θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R
w.
Then the MP-PS-NE are essential in θ ∈ Θ.
The theorem is proven in two steps. Firstly, it is shown that the value functions of MDP exhibit a
Lipschitz property in parameterisations in their reward functions (see Prop. 5 in the appendix).
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Proposition 5 Let {Mθ}θ∈Θ := 〈R, S,A, P, Rθ, γ〉θ∈Θ be a family of MDPs and denote by v
π⋆(θ),θ be
the optimal value function for the MDP Mθ, where Rθ is a reward function which is Lipschitz in the
parameter θ, then for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ:
d1
(
vπ
⋆(θ),θ, vπ
⋆(θ),θ′
)
≤
2‖R‖∞
1− γ
LRd2 (θ, θ
′) ,
Proof 9 Consider two MDPs, M1 and M2 and let us suppose v
π⋆,θ := sup
π′∈Π
vπ
′,θ and vπ
⋆,θ′ := sup
π′∈Π
vπ
′,θ′
are the optimal value functions associated to M1 and M2 respectively. Our task is to show that given
two reward functions Rθ and Rθ′, the value functions satisfy the following estimate:
d
(
vπ
⋆,θ, vπ
⋆,θ′
)
≤ cd (θ, θ′) , (48)
for some c > 0 which shows that the MDPs are Lipschitz in θ ∈ Θ.
Consider the MDPsM1 andM2 which differ only in their reward functions, i.e. M1 := 〈Rθ, S, A, P, γ〉
and M2 := 〈Rθ′, S, A, P, γ〉.
To prove the result, using Lemma 6, we have that∥∥∥∥sup
π′∈Π
vπ
′,θ
i − sup
π∈Π
vπ,θ
′
i
∥∥∥∥ ≤ sup
π
′∈Π
∥∥∥ vπ′,θi − vπ,θ′i ∥∥∥
= sup
π′∈Π
∣∣∣∣∣Est∼P,π′
[
T∑
t=0
γtRθ(st, at, )
]
− Est∼P,π′
[
T∑
t=0
γtRθ′(st, at)
] ∣∣∣∣∣
= sup
π′∈Π
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=0
γtEst∼P,π′ [Rθ(st, at)− Rθ′(st, at)]
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ c˜i ‖θ − θ
′‖ ,
where c˜i :=
LRθ
1−γ
‖R‖∞ using the boundedness and the Lipschitz condition on Rθ and γ > 0 which
concludes the proof of the proposition.
Proposition 6 Let pi⋆ ∈ NE{G(θ)} be a PS-MP-NE joint policy for the players playing the game
G(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ, then B is Lipschitz continuous in θ, in particular
d1
(
Bπ
⋆(θ),θ, Bπ
⋆(θ′),θ′
)
≤ 2
N
1− γ
L∂R∞
∂π
d2 (θ, θ
′) .
where LPθ are Lipschitz and L-Lipschitz constants.
Proof 10 For any θ ∈ Θ let the joint policy pi⋆(θ) ∈ Π be any PS-MP-NE joint policy for the game
G(θ) i.e. pi⋆(θ) ∈ NE{G(θ)} then using Prop. 4 it suffices to deduce the existence of a constant c
s.th. ∥∥∥∥sup
π∈Π
Bπ(θ),θ − sup
π∈Π
Bπ(θ
′),θ′
∥∥∥∥ ≤ c ‖θ − θ′‖ . (49)
where the constant is later specified.
Indeed, by Lemma 6 and Lemma 3, we have that∥∥∥∥sup
π∈Π
Bπ(θ),θ − sup
π∈Π
Bπ(θ
′),θ′
∥∥∥∥
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≤ sup
π∈Π
∥∥∥Bπ(θ),θ − Bπ(θ′),θ′∥∥∥
=sup
π∈Π
∥∥∥∥∥Est∼P,π
[
∞∑
t=0
∑
i∈N
γt
∫ 1
0
γ′(z)
(
∂Ri,θ(st,a)
∂πi
(γ(z))−
∂Rθ′(st,a)
∂πi
(γ(z))
)]∥∥∥∥∥
=sup
π∈Π
∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
t=0
∑
i∈N
γtEst∼P,π
[∫ 1
0
γ′(z)
(
∂Ri,θ(st,a)
∂πi
(γ(z))−
∂Ri,θ′(st,a)
∂πi
(γ(z))
)]∥∥∥∥∥
≤sup
π∈Π
∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
t=0
∑
i∈N
γtEst∼P,π
[
L∂Ri,θ
∂π
∫ 1
0
γ′(z) ‖θ − θ′‖ (γ(z))
]∥∥∥∥∥
≤
NL∂Ri,θ
∂π
1− γ
‖θ − θ′‖ ,
and hence we deduce the statement.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a first method of solving MP-NE for SGs with nonzero-sum payoffs. In
particular, we identified a subset of SGs, namely stochastic potential games that can be solved tractably.
The construction of this subset involved a new notion of potential games in the stochastic setting. We
showed that computing the MP-NE in pure strategies is reducible to solving a cooperative game with
an MDP representation. Although computing the NE for a non-zerosum SG is in general PSPACE -
hard, we have shown that in the special case of a SPG the solution is P-Complete. To find the
corresponding MP-NE for the SPGs we provided two algorithms which provably converge. Finally, we
further investigated the properties of the MP-NE, showing that it satisfies a continuity property under
changes of the game reward functions.
18
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Appendix
Algorithm 3
1: For a given game M(s), s ∈ S. Require φ(s, ·), initial strategy profile pi, constant κ
2: φ(s, ·)← κ
3: while training do
4: Visiting all profiles in M starting from pi
5: for i = 0,...,N do
6: i← deviating player
7: pia ← new joint strategy profile
8: pib ← new joint strategy profile
9: φπb(s)← φπa(s) +Rπbi (s)− R
πa
i (s)
10: end for
11: end while
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Proofs
Lemma 6 For any f : X ×X → R, g : X ×X → R, we have that:∥∥∥∥maxa∈X f(a)−maxa∈X g(a)
∥∥∥∥ ≤ maxa∈X ‖f(a)− g(a)‖ . (50)
Proof 11
f(a) ≤ ‖f(a)− g(a)‖+ g(a) (51)
=⇒ max
a∈X
f(a) ≤ max
a∈X
{‖f(a)− g(a)‖+ g(a)} (52)
≤ max
a∈X
‖f(a)− g(a)‖+max
a∈X
g(a). (53)
Deducting max
a∈X
g(a) from both sides of (53) yields:
max
a∈X
f(a)−max
a∈X
g(a) ≤ max
a∈X
‖f(a)− g(a)‖ . (54)
After reversing the roles of f and g and redoing steps (51) - (53), we deduce the desired result since
the RHS of (54) is unchanged.
Proof 8.1 (Proof of Prop. 3) Recall the proposition asserts the existence of a measurable function
B : Π× S → R s.t. the following holds for any i ∈ N
Es∼P (·|)
[
v
(πi,π−i)
i (s)− v
(π′i,π−i)
i (s)
]
= Es∼P (·|)
[
B(πi,π−i)(s)− B(π
′
i,π−i)(s)
]
. (55)
For the finite horizon case, the result is proven by induction on the number of time steps until the
end of the game. Unlike the infinite horizon case, for the finite horizon case the value function and
policy have an explicit time dependence.
We consider the case of the proposition at time T − 1 that is we evaluate the value functions at the
penultimate time step. In this case, we have that:
EsT−1∼P (·|)
[
v
(πi,π−i)
i,T−1 (sT−1)− v
(π′i,π−i)
i,T−1 (sT−1)
]
= EsT−1∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)Ri(sT−1, a
i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)
+ γ
∑
sT∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)v
(πi,π−i)
i (sT )
−
( ∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)Ri(sT−1, a
′i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)
+ γ
∑
sT∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
′i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)v
(π
′i,π−i)
i (sT )
])
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= EsT−1∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1; sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)φ(sT−1, a
i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)
−
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1; sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)φ(sT−1, a
′i
T−1, a
−i
T−1))
+ γ
∑
sT∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)v
(πi,π−i)
i (sT )
− γ
∑
sT∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
′i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)v
(π
′i,π−i)
i (sT )
]
= EsT−1∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1; sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)φ(sT−1, a
i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)
−
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1; sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)φ(sT−1, a
′i
T−1, a
−i
T−1))
+ γEsT∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)v
(πi,π−i)
i (sT )
−
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)v
πi,π−i
i (sT )
]]
.
(56)
We now observe that for any πi ∈ Πi and for any π−i ∈ Π−i we have that ∀i ∈ N , v
πi,π−i
i (sT ) =
EsT∼P (·|)
[∑
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a
i
sT
, sT )π−i(a
−i
sT
, sT )Ri(a
i
sT
, a−isT , sT )
]
.
By Prop. 1 we have that
EsT∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)Ri(sT , a
i, a−i) (57)
−
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
i, sT−1)π−i(a
−i, sT−1)Ri(sT , a
′i, a−i)
]
(58)
=
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
i, a−i)Ri(sT , a
i, a−i) (59)
−
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
′i, a−i)Ri(sT , a
′i, a−i) (60)
=
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
i, a−i)
[
φ(sT , a
i, a−i) + Fi(a
−i)
]
(61)
−
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
′i, a−i)
[
φ(sT , a
′i, a−i) + Fi(sT , a
′−i)
]
(62)
=
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
i, a−i)φ(sT , a
i, a−i) (63)
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−
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
′i, a−i)φ(sT−1, a
′i, a−i) (64)
+
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
i, a−i)Fi(a
−i) (65)
−
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
′i, a−i)Fi(a
−i) (66)
We now show the last two summations add to 0. Indeed, we have that∑
sT∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
P (sT ; a
i
T−1, a
−i
T−1) (67)
·
[
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)Fi(a
−i) (68)
− π′i(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)Fi(a
−i)
]
=
∑
sT∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
[
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)− π
′
i(a
i
T−1, sT−1)
]
(69)
· P (sT ; a
i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)Fi(a
−i) (70)
=
∑
sT∈S
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)
(
P (sT ; πi, a
−i
T−1)− P (sT ; π
′
i, a
−i
T−(k+1))
)
Fi(a
−i) (71)
= 0 (72)
We therefore find that∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
i, a−i)φ(sT , a
i, a−i) (73)
−
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
′i, a−i)φ(sT−1, a
′i, a−i) (74)
+
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
i, a−i)Fi(a
−i) (75)
−
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
′i, a−i)Fi(a
−i) (76)
=
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
i, a−i)φ(sT , a
i, a−i) (77)
−
∑
ST∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
′i, a−i)φ(sT , a
′i, a−i) (78)
= EsT∼P (·|)
[
φ(πi,π−i)(sT )− φ
(π′i,π−i)(sT )
]
(79)
Hence substituting (79) into (66), we find that
EsT−1∼P (·|)
[
v
(πi,π−i)
i,T−1 (sT−1)− v
(π′i,π−i)
i,T−1 (sT−1)
]
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= EsT−1∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)φ(sT−1, a
i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)
−
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1; sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)φ(sT−1, a
′i
T−1, a
−i
T−1))
+ γ
∑
sT∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)φ
πi,π−i(sT )
− γ
∑
sT∈S
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)P (sT ; a
′i
T−1, a
−′−i
T−1 )φ
πi,π−i(sT )
]
= EsT−1∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)φ(sT−1, a
i
T−1, a
−i
T−1)
−
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1; sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)φ(sT−1, a
′i
T−1, a
−i
T−1))
+ γEsT∼P (sT |·)
[ ∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)φ
πi,π−i(sT )
−
∑
ai
T−1∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−1∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−1, sT−1)π−i(a
−i
T−1, sT−1)φ
πi,π−i(sT )
]]
= EsT−1∼P (·|)
[
B(πi,π−i)(sT−1)i,T−1 − B
π′i,π−i(sT−1)i,T−1
]
, (80)
using the iterated law of expectations in the last line and where
B
(πi,π−i)
T (s) := Est∼P,πi,π−i
[
T∑
t=0
γtφ(st,at)|s ≡ s0]
]
. (81)
Hence, we have succeeded in proving that the expression (55) holds for T − k when k = 1.
Our next goal is to prove that the expression holds for any 0 < k ≤ T .
Note that for any T ≥ k > 0, we can write (81) as
B
(πi,π−i)
T−k (s) = Eπi,π−i

φ(s, aik, a−ik ) + γ ∑
sk+1∈S
P (s′; s, aik, a
−i
k )B
πi,π−i
T−1 (s
′) · 1k≤T

 . (82)
Now we consider the case when we evaluate the expression (55) for any 0 < k ≤ T . Our inductive
hypothesis is the the expression holds for some 0 < k ≤ T , that is for any 0 < k ≤ T we have that:
EsT−k∼P (·|)
[
v
(πi,π−i)
i,k (sT−k)− v
(π′i,π−i)
i,k (sT−k)
]
= EsT−k∼P (·|)
[
B
(πi,π−i)
k (sT−k)− B
(π′i,π−i)
k (sT−k)
]
. (83)
It remains to show that the expression holds for k + 1 time steps prior to the end of the horizon.
The result can be obtained using the dynamic programming principle and the base case (k = 1)
result.
First, we note that it is easy to see that given (83) and by Prop. 1, it must be the case that:
EsT−k∼P (·|)
[
v
(πi,π−i)
i,k (sT−k)
]
= EsT−k∼P (·|)
[
B
(πi,π−i)
k (sT−k) +G
π−i
i,k (sT−k)
]
. (84)
25
where G
π−i
i,k (s) := EP,π−i
[∑k
t=0 γ
tF−i(s, a
−i
t )
]
.
Moreover, we recall that F−i satisfies the condition F−i(s, a
−i
t ) = F−i(s
′, a−it ), hence G
π−i
i,k (s) =
G
π−i
i,k (s
′) so from now on we drop the dependence on s and write G
π−i
i,k .
We now observe that
EsT−k∼P (·|)
[
v
(πi,π−i)
i,k+1 (sT−(k+1))− v
(π′i,π−i)
i,k+1 (sT−(k+1))
]
= EsT−k∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·Ri(sT−(k+1), a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
(85)
+γ
∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·P (sT−k; a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))v
(πi,π−i)
i,k (sT−k)
(86)
−
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·Ri(sT−(k+1), a
′i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
+γ
∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·P (sT−k; a
′i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))v
(π
′i,π−i)
i,k (sT−k)
] (87)
= EsT−k∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·Ri(sT−(k+1), a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
(88)
−
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·Ri(sT−(k+1), a
′i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
]
+γEsT−k∼P (·|)
[ ∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·P (sT−k; a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))v
(πi,π−i)
i,k (sT−k)
(89)
−
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·
∑
P (sT−k; a
′i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))v
(π
′i,π−i)
i,k (sT−k)
]
.
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Studying the terms under the first expression, we observe that by construction, we have that:
EsT−k∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·Ri(sT−(k+1), a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
(90)
−
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·Ri(sT−(k+1), a
′i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
]
= EsT−k∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·φ(sT−(k+1), a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
(91)
−
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
·φ(sT−(k+1), a
′i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
]
.
(92)
We now study the terms within the second expectation.
Using (83) (i.e. the inductive hypothesis), we find that:∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
P (ST−k; a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
·
[
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))v
(πi,π−i)
i,k (sT−k)
− π′i(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))v
(π
′i,π−i)
i,k (sT−k)
]
=
∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
P (ST−k; a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
·
[
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
(
B
(πi,π−i)
k (sT−k) +G
π−i
i,k
)
− π′i(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
(
B
(πi,π−i)
k (sT−k) +G
π−i
i,k
)]
=
∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
P (ST−k; a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
·
[
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))B
(πi,π−i)
k (sT−k)
− π′i(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))B
(πi,π−i)
k (sT−k)
]
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+
∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
P (ST−k; a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
·
[
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))G
π−i
i,k
− π′i(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))G
π−i
i,k
]
Now∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
P (ST−k; a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1)) (93)
·
[
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))G
π−i
i,k (94)
− π′i(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))G
π−i
i,k
]
=
∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
[
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))− π
′
i(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
]
(95)
· P (ST−k; a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))G
π−i
i,k (96)
=
∑
sT−k∈S
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
(
P (ST−k; πi, a
−i
T−(k+1))− P (ST−k; π
′
i, a
−i
T−(k+1))
)
G
π−i
i,k
(97)
= 0 (98)
We therefore find that:∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
P (s; aiT−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
·
[
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))v
(πi,π−i)
i,k (sT−k)
− π′i(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))v
(π
′i,π−i)
i,k (sT−k)
]
=
∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
P (s; aiT−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
·
[
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))B
πi,π−i
k (sT−k)
− π′i(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))B
π
′i,π−i
k (sT−k)
]
,
(99)
using (83) (i.e. the inductive hypothesis).
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Now combining (92) and (99) leads to the fact that:
EsT−k∼P (·|)
[
v
(πi,π−i)
i,k+1 (sT−(k+1))− v
(π′i,π−i)
i,k+1 (sT−(k+1))
]
=
∑
sT−k∈S
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
P (sT−k; a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
·
[
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))B
πi,π−i
k (sT−k)
− π′i(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))B
π
′i,π−i
k (sT−k)
]
,
(100)
+EsT−(k+1)∼P (·|)
[ ∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
πi(a
i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
· φ(sT−(k+1), a
i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
−
∑
ai
T−(k+1)
∈Ai
∑
a−i
T−(k+1)
∈A−i
π′i(a
′i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))π−i(a
−i
T−(k+1), sT−(k+1))
· φ(sT−(k+1), a
′i
T−(k+1), a
−i
T−(k+1))
]
,
which immediately suggests that
EsT−(k+1)∼P (·|)
[
v
(πi,π−i)
i,k+1 (sT−(k+1))− v
(π′i,π−i)
i,k+1 (sT−(k+1))
]
= EsT−(k+1)∼P (·|)
[
B
(πi,π−i)
k+1 (sT−(k+1))− B
(π′i,π−i)
k+1 (sT−(k+1))
]
, (101)
where
B
(πi,π−i)
k (s) = Eπi,π−i
[
φ(sk, a
i
k, a
−i
k ) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′; s, aik, a
−i
k )B
πi,π−i
k−1 (s
′)
]
, (102)
from which we deduce the result.
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